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Preface 
Much has by now been written about the "African crisis" and studies 
have also appeared focusing on the nature of structural adjustment 
programmes in Africa. EMP/RU's own project on Food Security in Africa. 
findings of which were reported in a special issue of the International 
Labour Review (Vol. 127, no. 6, December 1988) addressed aspects of such 
programmes in selected African countries from the point of view of food 
entitlement. However systematic analyses of the rationale and impact of 
adjustment programmes on labour allocation are still rare. The study 
reported here as part of EMP/RU's project on Structural Adjustment 
Programmes and Rural Labour Markets in Africa attempts to fill this gap. 
The project comprises case studies of five African countries - Zambia, 
Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Cote d'lvoire - and builds upon findings 
about the African economies emerging from recent work carried out at 
EMP/RU, particularly the Food Security in Africa project and the 
forthcoming volume on Rural-Urban Income Distribution in Africa. 
The present study has been done by Prof. John Weeks of Middlebury 
College, Vermont and concerns the case of Sierra Leone. The author shows 
that the Sierra Leonean economy fell into crisis not because of lagging 
agricultural exports but mineral exports. The country has undergone 
adjustment programmes under the aegis of the IMF since a long time, with 
at the best mixed results. The author questions the basic premise of 
adjustment programmes - that prices of agricultural products were 
distorted and that idle resources are available to elicit a significant 
supply response from the farmers. He shows that contrary to assertions by 
proponents of adjustment programmes, no idle land exists in Sierra Leone 
which could be brought under cultivation in response to higher prices. 
The Sierra Leonean case provides the author another contrast with the 
general African case in that the basic staple in Sierra Leone is rice 
which is very much a tradeable commodity, unlike other African staples 
which generally do not enter world markets. Structural adjustment 
programmes in Sierra Leone therefore attempted to raise the price of both 
export crops as well as rice, thus minimising intra-agriculture shifts in 
labour allocation. As in other African countries the major switch in 
relative prices occurred between rural and urban areas but as in other 
African countries no shifts in rural-urban labour allocation transpired. 
Samir Radwan 
Chief 
Rural Employment Policies Branch 
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•I. Introduction 
This paper addresses the question of the impact of structural 
adjustment programmes on the agricultural economy of Sierra Leone and by 
extension its ramifications for rural, urban and rural-urban labour 
markets. Macroeconomic policies which are included within adjustment 
programmes are part of the armoury of policies of all countries; what is 
new about the current adjustment programmes is the strict conditionality 
which accompanies them, particularly with respect to changes in relative 
prices. It is these changes that have the potential to affect labour 
markets and that will therefore provide the focus of this paper. 
As is well-documented, the sub-Saharan African countries in the 
1970s and 1980s suffered from extremely poor growth performance, usually 
associated with severe balance of payments pressures. The World Bank and 
the IMF for the most part focused on the trade balance as the fundamental 
problem of African countries, with the solution being an expansion of 
exports. This expansion would be achieved through real devaluations, 
the proposed causality being as follows: nominal devaluation combined 
with monetary restraint results in real devaluation; real devaluation 
shifts relative prices toward tradeable commodities, stimulating greater 
output, and on the demand side, lowers the foreign currency price of a 
country's exports as compared to those same tradeable commodities produced 
elsewhere; and if the world demand for these products is price elastic, 
then all countries producing a given commodity can effect a real 
devaluation and gain (i.e., real devaluation need not be a 
"beggar-thy-neighbour" policy). Simultaneously the real devaluation 
should reduce imports, further improving the trade balance. In summary, 
this approach has two aspects: (1) it relates growth of gross domestic 
product to export growth; and (2) treats balance-of-payments pressures as 
the major constraint on growth. Both of these aspects are viewed as 
exchange rate determined. 
The role of the agricultural sector is seen as central in the 
adjustment measures because of the implicit belief that a decline in 
agricultural exports caused the African crisis. Further, in a number of 
African countries food production lagged behind apparent consumption in 
the 1970s and 1980s, requiring commercial and concessionary food imports. 
Thus, in addition to raising exports, the purpose of adjustment would be 
to raise food production. This dual emphasis, exports and food, reflects 
the dual role of the agricultural sector in the growth process. 
Whether or not this sequence of causality can be said to be correct 
in abstract theory, it was of limited relevance to the problems of 
Sierra Leone in the 1960s and 1970s because of her reliance on exports of 
diamonds and iron ore, rather than agricultural goods. Devaluation would 
have only limited impact upon these exports either on the supply or the 
demand side. In any case the issue was of no particular policy 
importance since the reserves of both iron ore and diamonds were 
declining. 
However, the issue of devaluation remains crucial because of its 
preponderant position in the adjustment programmes. Particularly 
important in this respect are impacts on: (1) economic incentives for 
export crops versus food crops; and (2) rural versus urban income gains 
and losses. These primary issues will in the course of the analysis raise 
- 2 -
other matters that will require investigation: price responsiveness of 
agricultural producers and the implied reallocation of resources; the 
role of marketing boards and other market interventions; and 
macroeconomic issues such as inflation. 
II. Crisis, perceptions and adjustment 
Crisis 
Unlike other SSA countries, problems in agriculture did not cause 
the decline of the Sierra Leone economy. In 1970 agriculture and industry 
(mostly mining) each accounted for about one-quarter of GDP. By the 
mid-1980s, agriculture's share had risen to over 40 per cent and 
industry's fallen to below 10 per cent, during a period when real GDP 
expanded by 23 per cent. It remains the case, however, that agriculture 
has to play the leading role both for the future expansion of exports and 
overall growth of GDP. In terms of labour markets, the shift in the 
composition of output and exports implied a reallocation of labour from 
non-agricultural to agricultural activities. This broad summary of "what 
happened" in Sierra Leone is elaborated below, with the role of the 
agricultural sector placed in its proper context. Analysis begins with 
table 1, a composite table containing GDP, GDP per capita and agricultural 
indicators (food as well as export). 
Per capita income in 1985-86 (the last year for which national 
accounts are available) was measured at the same level as in 1966-67 and 
16 per cent below the peak reached in 1981-82. Instability and decline 
have characterised the economy since independence: over the 22 years 
since 1963, per capita income fell in nine years* and instability in 
growth rates increased in each successive decade. The instability 
coincided with - and was likely caused by - an even greater instability in 
the external economic environment. The price terms of trade for the three 
decades declined on average by two per cent each year and in only nine 
years out of 23 did the terms improve. Such a decline would have produced 
serious problems of economic management even had the economy faced no 
domestic production constraints. The fact is Sierra Leone's two major 
export products (diamonds and iron ore) collapsed. From 1963 to 1975, 
diamonds accounted, for 60 per cent of the value of exports and iron ore 
for 13 per cent. By the early 1980s around US$75 million had been lost 
in export earnings from the decline of mineral production, or about half 
the average value of exports for the 1970s. The only immediate candidates 
for replacing this loss were three tree crops, coffee, cocoa, and palm 
kernels. The export value of these three perennials increased in the 
1970s, from an average of US$20 million a year for the first half of the 
decade to over US$50 million during the second half but a part of this 
increase represented buoyant world prices, which would not continue into 
the next decade. Therefore, the likelihood of a major expansion in 
revenue from the three products was unlikely unless substantial 
investments were undertaken to increase output. The crisis of the 1980s 
put paid to that hope. Given the long gestation period involved in 
increasing the tree crop output, it is doubtful that any policy ingenuity 
could have accomplished the task of making the agricultural sector the 
engine of growth of the monetary economy, certainly not a laissez-faire 
regime in which the Government gave no lead into an uncertain future. 
WPlOlPl/cw 
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Table 1. GDP, agricultural GDP, export production and food 
production per capita. 1963-64/1986-87 (1972-73 prices) 
GDP Rate GDP Rate AgVA Index of 
(Leone of per of per cap Exp. crop Food prod 









































































































































































































Notes: Per cent changes are measured as the first relative difference to reduce base 
year bias. Percentage changes calculated from original data to one decimal 
place. Therefore, these percentages may not coincide with result calculated 
from the numbers in the table which are rounded off to the nearest integer. 
Similarly, the per capita figures are derived from data to one or more decimal 
places; so, for example, the exact value in column three would not be obtained 
by dividing column one by the population. 
GDP: millions of 1972-73 leones. 
Population: Census year figures with other years extrapolations. 
AQVA per cap: Agricultural GDP or agriculture value added, per capita in 
1972-73 leones. Included is crop agriculture and animal husbandry; thus, 
excluding fishing and forestry The deflation uses the index for agriculture, 
fishing and forestry. Since the latter two are rather small compared to the 
total, any bias would be minor. 
ExCrop per cap: Export crop production per capita is measured by adding annual 
marketing board purchases of coffee, cocoa and palm kernels using the average 
export price for 1972 and 1973. This aggregate is then divided by the estimated 
population and converted to an index, 1972-73=100. 
Food Prd. per cap: This is the FA0 food per capita food production index. The 
base year has been shifted. 
Source: CS0 1980 and 1987a. 
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The situation of the economy thus gave little cause for optimism at 
the beginning of the 1980s, and that expectation was unfortunately 
fulfilled. Mineral exports declined further, as did agricultural export 
prices, the fiscal base contracted, and foreign debt became increasingly 
unserviceable to the point of accumulating arrears. The agricultural 
sector became burdened with two difficult tasks: simultaneously to 
replace the export earnings and to feed the population. It met only 
partial success. By 1984-85 diamonds and iron ore still constituted over 
60 per cent of exports; cocoa provided 18 per cent, coffee 13 per cent, 
and palm kernels 3 per cent (UNCTAD, 1988, table 4.3). Given that total 
export volume was falling (by more than one-half between 1973 and 1987, 
ibid., food production was generally stagnant according to FAO estimates 
(see table 1, last column). Cereal imports increased, but not by as much 
as one would expect from food production declines. Agricultural and food 
production per capita did not fall catastrophically. Compared to other 
African countries, one does not get a sense of large falls in rural 
incomes (an issue pursued in the next section). Thus, the agricultural 
sector as a whole performed better than the economy, especially in the 
1980s. This is indicated by the relative constancy of agricultural value 
added per capita compared to GDP per capita, which declined (table 1). 
Agricultural prices also increased faster than non-agricultural prices and 
agriculture's share of the GDP increased from 25 per cent in 1970 and 30 
per cent in 1980 to 42 per cent in 1986 (ibid., table 6.4). In the 
meantime, the share of industrial GDP declined from 24 per cent in 1970 to 
6 per cent in 1986, reflecting the contraction in the mining sector. 
Thus, the economy became more agriculturally oriented internally, though 
externally still dependent upon mineral exports. 
To complete the story of the economic crisis table 2 shows data on 
trade balance and inflation. Until the late 1970s the trade imbalance was 
quite modest, but thereafter it worsened rapidly as imports rose from an 
average of US$200 million for 1974-77 to over US$300 million for 1978-82. 
Starting in 1980 imports were cut back sharply with the average for the 
five years 1983-87 dropping to below US$150 million. Between 1980 and 
1987 imports fell by 14 per cent per annum, and with imports at 30-40 per 
cent of their previous level, only the bare necessities were entering the 
country. One can therefore conclude that by the mid-1980s the role of the 
exchange rate in restricting imports was minimal. 
Sierra Leone's crisis thus was of a different nature from that of 
most SSA countries. However, could it be the case that the producer price 
was so low that farmers were absolutely discouraged such that the market 
signals had little effect? While this is what the Bank and the Fund 
allege, it is an extremely difficult question to answer without data on 
cost of production, which are not available. The best one can do is to 
work with indirect evidence, presented in table 1, which gives marketing 
board purchases and sales along with relevant relative prices. 
However, the solution suggested by the multilaterals was similar, 
with great emphasis upon devaluation. Given that imports had been 
compressed to a minimum and that export crops required investments to 
expand, the exchange rate could have little effect on the trade balance. 
Since the exchange rate could not equilibrate the trade balance (or 
balance of payments more generally), the decision to "float" it (at the 
insistence of the multilaterals) resulted in continuous nominal 
devaluation (a "sink", one might say) after 1982, particularly after 
WPlOlPl/cw 
- 5 -
































































































































































































































may not precisely equal exports minus imports as given in the 
table due to rounding to integers. 
Cost of Living: Freetown cost-of-living index. 
Terms of trade: Ratio of index of export prices to index of 
import prices. 
Trade balance: Merchandise exports minus merchandise imports 
for calendar year. 
FA0 (1979), p. 79 and FA0 (1987), p. 93; CSO, 1980 and 1987a; 
World Bank, 1969, 1974, and 1981; UNCTAD, 1988; BSL, items a, 
b, c; UN, 1971, pp. 112-113; 1976, pp. 114-115; 1980, pp. 
112-113; 1986, p. 116; and 1988, p. 117; IMF, 1989. 
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1986. The effect showed up in the price level, with inflation 
proceeding at an annual rate in excess of 50 per cent beginning in 
1982-83. 
Perceptions 
Perceptions of the malaise of the Sierra Leonean economy have 
changed drastically, especially on the part of the multi-lateral agencies 
and these have obviously impacted on the remedies suggested. At the start 
of the 1980s there was general agreement that the extreme dependence on 
depleting mineral exports was the cause of the Sierra Leonean crisis and 
that agriculture would have to be the new growth sector. It was 
recognised that the necessary restructuring would not be costless8 and 
would require government intervention to ensure that it happened within an 
equitable framework. This dual emphasis, equity and sustainable growth, 
in fact formed the main theme of the 1978 ILO/JASPA report. The report 
cautioned that neither of these goals could be achieved without careful 
planning (JASPA, 1981, esp. ix-xix) and the same view was expressed in a 
World Bank report of 1981, whose title was quite similar to that of the 
JASPA report (Prospects for Growth and Equity in the former case and 
Ensuring Equitable Growthin the latter).3Its priorities like that of 
the JASPA report were stated to be "growth and poverty alleviation." To 
address these issues the public sector "may need to assume a leadership 
role ...", in part because that sector could "mobilise external savings 
more readily than the private sector ..." (World Bank, 1981, p. ii) and 
since it was judged that unregulated markets-functioned inefficiently in 
Sierra Leone, particularly in agriculture.10 The report called for 
taxation of the rich11 and endorsed the Government's policies of 
subsidising mass consumption items. The rice policy was pronounced to be 
"consistent with the self-sufficiency objective". Subsidisation of 
kerosene was "... socially justified because [it] is used exclusively by 
the lower income groups" (World Bank, 31 July 1981, pp. vi and ix). l z 
Overall, the subsidy policies were judged to have played a positive role 
in alleviating poverty: "elsewhere in the economy ... preferential 
consumer subsidies also assist in mitigating inequalities" (World Bank, 
1981, p. vii). No indication was available that the Bank felt that market 
interventions in agriculture seriously distorted rural or urban labour 
markets, the primary concern of the present study. 
Within three years the Bank had reversed its position. On rice 
policy it wrote, 
Government's policies with respect to the incentive 
framework have had a serious effect on agricultural 
production. The overvalued leone imposed low producer prices 
for the export crops as well for rice, since imports at the low 
rate of exchange depressed the domestic urban market price 
(World Bank, 7 March 1984, p. vii). 
Rice subsidies should be eliminated with two goals explicitly 
stated: to increase production and decrease domestic consumption (World 
Bank, 1984, p. 27). An argument was made that the recommended rice policy 
would improve income distribution: 
Higher prices to producers who are mostly smallholders, will 
directly contribute to the goals of greater production, assist 
WPlOlPl/cw 
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in addressing the rural-urban income imbalance, and weaken the 
incentive to migrate. The resulting redistribution of income 
will go in the right direction, since urban income levels are 
currently distorted upward by the excess of public sector 
employment and, until recently, undervaluation of rice prices 
(World Bank, 7 March 1984, p. 31). 
This conclusion is relevant to the subsequent analysis of labour 
markets, because of its underlying assumptions: (1) poverty in Sierra 
Leone is for all practical purposes a rural phenomenon; (2) the rural poor 
are net sellers of agricultural products, not net buyers; (3) there is a 
significant rural-urban income gap with reference to potential migration 
groups; and (4) public sector employment is relatively well-remunerated. 
Each of these points is considered in subsequent discussion. The 1981 
report, as shown before, had taken quite a different view. Particularly 
worth noting is its comment on urban employment, where it said that there 
was a "relative lack of high-wage islands in the public and private 
sectors" (p. vii). 
Following upon the 1984 agricultural sector report the Bank's 1985 
review of public expenditures referred to price subsidies as "ad hoc" and 
"counterproductive". Overall, the economy was assessed as being seriously 
mismanaged, growth of recurrent expenditure being singled out for special 
mention (World Bank, 1985, p. ii). A major cut in government expenditure 
and the complete elimination of all subsidies had become conditionality 
for a Bank adjustment loan. 3 These macroeconomic measures were seen as 
necessary to complement a shift towards less market intervention: 
Markets ... are not always perfect, and it is necessary for the 
Government to step in and take action when failures occur. In 
Sierra Leone, Government intervention has tended to focus on 
areas where the markets work best, thereby preventing prices 
from changing to bring about the desired reallocation of 
resources (World Bank, 1985, p. 100). 
The turnaround demonstrates that even to the skilled professionals 
of the World Bank the precise nature of the economy's problems and their 
solution was not unequivocal. What seemed to be sound aspects of economic 
management at the beginning of the 1980s appeared a few years later to be 
manifestations of mismanagement. This should make it more understandable 
that the Government itself, which would bear the political cost of 
policies, had difficulty developing a coherent and successful policy 
package. 
Adjustment 
Based on these kinds of perceptions the Sierra Leone Government 
entered into five agreements with the IMF, beginning with the three-year 
arrangement of 1967-69. These are summarised in table 3. After the 
rather small borrowing agreement in 1977, three programmes were put in 
place (1981, 1983 and 1986), all of which were cancelled by the Fund after 
the first tranche. Thus, strictly speaking, the Sierra Leone Government 
was only briefly involved in policy-based lending programmes of the IMF 
and World Bank during the 1980s. However in practice economic policies 
throughout the decade reflected the influence of these programmes, 
operational, suspended or anticipated. From about 1985, the Government 
WPlOlPl/cw 
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in Sierra Leone. 1967-87 
Policy intervention 
IMF stabilisation programme 
IMF loan of Le 7 million from 
trust fund 
IMF 3-year programme begins 
IMF programme agreed 
Ongoing discussions with 
World Bank about SAL 
Outcome 
Conditionality met, all 
tranches disbursed 
Fully disbursed 
Cancelled after first 
tranche 







World Bank agriculture mission: 
WB public expenditure report 
recommends large budget cuts, 
review of public enterprises, 
privatisation 
One-year stand-by arrangement 
agreed with the IMF 
IMF suspends stand-by 
arrangement 
"Shadow" programme of 
IMF and WB begins 
No lending involved 
Disbursement begins of 
first tranche 
End of IMF programme 
Conditionality but no 
funding 
Source: GSL, September 1985; and GSL, June 1987; and interviews with 
officials at the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Bank 
of Sierra Leone. 
informally accepted conditionality as a prerequisite for subsequent 
agreement on a formal programme. In other words, the Government operated 
under the constraint of multilateral conditionality without the benefit of 
multilateral funding, though anticipating such funding should its policies 
be deemed to comply with IMF and World Bank judgement of economic 
performance. Thus one may treat the entire decade of the 1980s as one 




III. Adjustment programmes and labour markets 
A profile of the agricultural sector*6 
Sierra Leonean agriculture in the 1980s was characterised by 
relatively low technology and a high degree of subsistence. As the 1981 
JASPA mission noted: 
[B]y and large, small acreages, low yields, low incomes provide 
us the dominant picture of Sierra Leonean agriculture, a 
picture that has remained more or less unchanged over many 
decades. There has been no change in the use of either 
labour-saving or yield-increasing technology ... (JASPA, 1981, 
p. 111). 
A farm survey in 1970-71 estimated that only for cocoa and coffee 
did a majority of the growers sell a surplus on the market, while for rice 
the proportion was 31 per cent. Total crop value added was estimated as 
Le 72 million (including imputed value of subsistence), with the marketed 
output of non-export crops being put at less than Le 8 million (CSO, 1972, 
p. 73). Coffee, cocoa, and palm kernels brought in an additional Le 10 
million, yielding a figure for cash agriculture of Le 18 million. If one 
deducts the intermediate component of sales, the degree of monetisation of 
crop agriculture could have been of the order of 20 per cent. In 1984 the 
World Bank offered an open-ended guess, that "less than 40 per cent of 
total production [entered] the monetised economy" (World Bank, 1984, 
p. iv). By these estimates only one-third of crop value was monetised. 
What is important is that as far as food crops are concerned most farmers 
remain subsistence-oriented. As Johnny observed, "This overriding 
traditional emphasis on security helps to explain the lack of specialised 
production .. why all producers [in Sierra Leone] tend to grow the same 
staple crops regardless of agronomic conditions ... " (Johnny, 1981, 
p. 16). 
Rice is by far the most important food crop in Sierra Leone, and 
would seem to be the first priority of all farmers (JASPA, 1981, p. 115). 
Soil fertility is maintained through shifting cultivation, rice grown 
under this system being called "upland rice" in Sierra Leone. A second 
system to manage the fertility problem is the swampland system. Swamp 
cultivation, just as shifting cultivation, represents a system of tapping 
the natural fertility of the soil. However, swamps can be cultivated 
continuously (although in Sierra Leone they, too, are left fallow 
periodically), and can support a bigger population per acre than shifting 
cultivation. Higher yields also contribute to this (JASPA, 1981, p. 
117). Most of the rice in Sierra Leone is grown under the first system, 
but the trend as revealed by two agricultural censuses - 1963-66 and 
1970-71 - was towards swampland rice (JASPA, 1981, p. 116). In fact in 
the 1970s great hopes were pinned on the expansion of swampland rice. 
This failed to materialise reflecting a number of obstacles facing the 
small farmer, important among them being "... [the] heavy initial labour 
inputs, the preferred taste of upland varieties, the coldness of the water 
and associated diseases, and the wide range of other crops which could be 
produced on an upland farm" (Binns, 1987, p. 85; see also Johnny, 1981, 
p. 11). Four other reasons are given in the JASPA report. First, the 
initial establishment of a swamp is very labour-consuming, second, swamp 
rice does not lend itself to cultivation with other food crops unlike 
upland rice, which is almost always grown in mixtures. Third upland 
WPlOlPl/cw 
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cultivation is "the way of life". Social life revolves around this 
system, and to a tradition-oriented farmer it is the "known thing" that is 
important. (JASPA, 1981, p. 118). Finally, swampland rice is constrained 
by seasonal labour shortages. Managing labour shortages at peak periods 
and phasing cultivation for full utilisation of agriculture's two most 
important resources is a problem not fully appreciated by those who 
suggest an abundance of land in Sierra Leone.17 
There at least two reasons to doubt the existence of surplus land. 
First, available evidence indicates that given the techniques of 
production, what land can be used is under cultivation. Closer to the 
truth is probably the judgement of the JASPA report which concluded that 
under existing techniques Sierra Leonean agriculture in the late 1970s was 
on the verge of a crisis in which the limits of the system to feed the 
country's increasingly urban population had been reached. More land might 
well come under cultivation in the short run in response to increased 
prices, but it would reflect an unsustainable land pressure leading to 
environmental degradation. 
The second factor that casts doubt on the idle-land hypothesis is 
based on the rationality of the peasant farmers. Given that malnutrition 
exists in rural Sierra Leone, 8 "idle land" would imply that farm 
families are induced by low prices to choose hunger rather than being 
adequately fed. 
Rural inequality 
While most agricultural producers in Sierra Leone are 
"smallholders", inequality in the distribution of land was substantial in 
the 1980s. This is shown in table 4, based on two farm surveys.19 From 
the early 1970s to the mid-1980s the number of farms declined by 22 per 
cent, while the number of rural households, farm and non-farm, fell by 11 
per cent. 0 At the same time the proportion of farms less than five 
acres increased from 62 to 74 per cent. Since the actual number of farms 
in this category fell slightly, from 177,000 to 166,000, the increased 
proportion cannot be explained by population growth. Rather, it appears 
that Sierra Leone had entered the stage of agricultural transition in 
which the farm population declines and concentration of ownership 
increases. This pattern, characteristic of much of Latin America for 
decades, eventually generates landlessness, though this problem is as yet 
minor in Sierra Leone. 
Table 4. Percentage distribution of farm households 
bv size of holding. 1970-71 and 1984-85 








Under 1 acre 
1 to 5 acres 
5 to 10 acres 
10 to 15 acres 
15 and over 
Total farms ('000s): 








Among a wealth of other information the 1984-85 survey provides data 
on the crops grown, area planted, and yields per hectare. This 
information is used to estimate total farm income by farm size. 
Generalisations about the impact of economic policies on farmers in Africa 
tend to lump all producers together as if the average were not only 
typical but the rule. The information in the farm survey helps to correct 
that tendency. By multiplying area planted by yields one obtains output 
and by-.multiplying by the 1984-85 farmgate price the value of this 
output 21 This gross income from crops was then rendered into net 
income using the information from a 1974-75 farm survey of 552 smallholder 
production units (Spencer and Byerlee, 1977). The resulting estimate of 
monetary farm income makes no distinction between actual sales and imputed 
value of subsistence production. For some purposes this would be a major 
failing, for farm households eat rice (for example), not the price of 
rice. However, here the distinction between sales and on-farm consumption 
is not important. The intent is to derive comparable income figures 
across farm sizes, which necessarily requires aggregation of crops with 
monetary weights. 
The results are 
is indicated, though 
that the distribution 
similarly to the way 
families had incomes 
22 shown in table 5. c Substantial rural inequality 
not of the degree found in Latin America. Assuming 
of households is skewed within farm size ranges 
it is among ranges, then around 70 per cent of 
below the mean in 1984-85. As another measure of 
inequality, average crop income for the wealthiest three per cent of 
families (those with holdings over six hectares) was 18 times greater than 
the average for the poorest 22 per cent (those with holdings under 
one-half hectare). Structural adjustment programmes risk exacerbating 
this inequality since according to the 1984-85 farm survey large farmers 
sell a greater proportion of their rice and other crops than small 
farmers.23 
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Total 100.0 940.3 223.3 
Source: MAF, 1986; and MAF, August 1988. 
4 213 100 
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Further, a substantial number of rural households apparently were 
not self-sufficient in rice in 1984-85; i.e. they were net rice buyers. 
One can then conclude that ceteris paribus an increase in rice price 
would: (a) raise overall agricutural cash income (a rice surplus over 
subsistence implies this); (b) increase the real incomes of more farm 
households than it reduces (net food sellers outweigh net food buyers); 
but (c) worsen the distribution of farm income (because larger farms sell 
proportionately more than small farms). 
The point about net food buyers can be broadened to include the 
urban sector and the rural non-farm households. In general, an increase 
in food prices redistributes income away from net food buyers and toward 
net food sellers (both producers and middlemen). Net food buyers fall 
into three categories: urban dwellers, food-deficit farm households, and 
rural non-farm families. An estimation of their distribution appears in 
table 6. While food-deficit farm families contribute to the total of net 
food buying households, the other two groups are the more important. In 
1963-64, only 19 per cent of rural families were non-farm; by 1985-86 
their share was 30 per cent, perhaps reflecting increasing pressure on 
land. Along with this shift went rapid urbanisation, with the number of 
urban families increasing at a compound rate of 5.8 per cent from 1963-64 
to 1985-86. If we extrapolate for non-census years, the numbers in the 
table imply that around 1973 a majority of families in Sierra Leone became 
net food buyers. Thus while agriculture is extremely important in Sierra 
Leone, since the mid-1970s the country has been an economy of net food 
buyers. The implications for structural adjustment should be clear: 
policies which raise relative food prices impoverish most people in the 
country. 
Table 6. Net food buying households, census years ('000) 
Category 1963-64 1974-75 1985-86 
Total households 354 459 545 
Net food-buyers: 156 234 374 
farm 33 44 43 
rural non-farm 54 69 92 
urban 69 121 239 
Food-buyers (per cent) 44.0 51.0 68.8 
Source: CSO, 1967, 1972; MAF, 1986. 
Moving from food to export crops, the 1984-85 survey shows clearly 
that the production of these is overwhelmingly concentrated on the larger 
farms. Table 7 shows statistics on land in the three major export crops 
(coffee, cocoa and palm trees) by size of farm. The second column repeats 
the distribution of farms for convenience, followed by the total land in 
each size range. Then columns 4-6 give the distribution of the area for 
the three crops across ranges, while the last column shows the proportion 
of land for each range that was planted in the three crops. Comparing 
column 3 with columns 4 through 6, one sees that the distribution of land 
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in export crops was more skewed than the distribution of all land. For 
example, farms under one hectare (representing 48 per cent of households) 
held 16 per cent of all land, but planted only 5 per cent of all land in 
coffee, 5 per cent of cocoa, and 11 per cent of palm trees (the last being 
the least important export crop). At the other end of the distribution, 
farms over four hectares (8 per cent of households) held one per cent of 
the land but accounted for 48 per cent of coffee area, 55 per cent of 
cocoa, and 50 per cent of palm trees. The last column of the table gives 
the proportion of land in each size range devoted to the three export 
crops. As implied by columns 4-6, the amount of land in these crops rises 
with the farm size, from 7 per cent for the smallest size category to over 
half the cultivated area for farms over six hectares. The message is 
clear: large farmers grow most of the cash crops and an increase in their 
price would worsen the distribution of farm income. 
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Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 30.8 
Note: Last column gives the proportion of land in each size range 
devoted to the three export crops. 
* Commercially planted; i.e., area under wild trees excluded. 
Source: MAF, 1986, table 16. 
Rural-urban inequality 
The increase in rural incomes relatively to urban incomes is also 
justified on the grounds of a vast income gap in favour of town dwellers. 
Much of the discussion of rural-urban differences is rather vague, making 
no distinction between the different income classes within each sector. 
The approach here is to focus on urban wage incomes and rural farm 
incomes, rather than broad averages for the urban and rural sectors. 
These measurements are directly relevant to the structural adjustment 
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•debate, since one purpose of these programmes is to raise farm incomes in 
order to promote exports, discourage migration and foster greater equality 
of income. 
Table 8 shows the comparison of farm incomes and urban wages. The 
figures incorporate an assumption that households do not have secondary 
sources of income. Thus, it is more precise to identify the calculations 
that follow as farm income per household and wage income for a household 
with only one wage earner and no non-wage income, the qualification does 
not nullify the conclusions that follow. Urban wage incomes in the table 
are the annual equivalent of average weekly non-agricultural 
earnings.24 Some over-estimate may be involved here, for it has been 
assumed that the average worker was employed a full 52 weeks. 
Notwithstanding the data problems, the results are surprising if one is a 
believer in the myth of the privileged African working class. 
Immediately after independence, wage incomes rose relatively to farm 
incomes, beginning 20 per cent lower in 1963-64 and rising to 60 per cent 
higher in 1970-71. Subsequently there followed a continuous and 
precipitous decline, such that in 1985-86 wage income was only 28 per cent 
of farm .income (37 per cent on a per capita basis, column 4 of 
table 7 ) . 2 5 
Jamal had calculated a poverty line for urban areas for the JASPA 
mission at Le 620 for 1977-78. This poverty line was conservative, both 
because it was lower than alternative measures and because it referred to 
a family of four, while the average urban family over these years was 
six. 6 The poverty line can be extended back to 1957 and forward to 
1988 by adjusting for inflation. For the pre-independence years, 1957-63, 
the wage was well below poverty level for a family of four by about 25-30 
per cent. From 1966 to 1973, the average wage came close to covering this 
measure of basic needs, but subsequently a family seeking to subsist on 
the average wage alone would have sunk deeper and deeper into poverty. By 
1981, the average wage would barely have covered food expenditure alone, 
and in 1988 the hypothetical average family would have exhausted its 
monthly wage income on food alone within a week. Urban families have 
managed to stay above food poverty through survival - or straddling -
strategies involving family members in all sectors of the economy - formal 
as well as informal, rural as well as urban. 
The fall in wages does not signify an improved distribution of 
income. Columns 4, 7 and 8 provide the information for this. In 1974-75 
the income per family member for both families and wage earners was 
roughly the same. Wage incomes fell relatively to farm incomes as well as 
GDP per capita thereafter and hence income distribution clearly worsened. 
This finding contradicts the 1984 World Bank report, which argued that an 
increase in farm incomes relatively to wage incomes would ensure that "the 
resulting redistribution of income will go in the right direction" (World 
Bank, 1984, p. 31). By the second half of the 1970s any redistribution 
from wage incomes to farm incomes on average went in the "wrong" 
direction. Moreover, evidence shows that concurrent redistributions also 
produced greater inequality. Table 9 shows what happened to producer real 
wage in the manufacturing sector. 8 
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Table 8. A comparison of farm incomes and wages and related magnitudes. 1963-85 
Ratio: Wage to Real incomes Divided by GDP per capita 
farm income (1973 = 100) per capita 
Farm Average Per family Per cap. Farm Wage Farm Wage Cost of 
family non-agric. incomes incomes living 
income wage per cap. per cap. (Freetown) 







































































































































































































































Notes: Columns 1 and 2 (not counting the column of dates), farm family incomes and the average 
non-agricultural wage, are measures in current Leone. 
Column 3 is the ratio of column to column 1. 
In column 4, farm family incomes and average non-agricultural wage have been divided by 
the average family size for farm and urban families, then expressed as a ratio. 
Column 5 and 6 are columns 1 and 2 divided by the Freetown cost-of-living index (given in 
column 9), with all indices in the table set 1973=100 for consistency. 
Columns 7 and 8 are columns 1 and 2, first divided by family size (to give incomes per 
person in current Leone, rather than 1973 Leone, as in columns 5 and 6), then divided by 
aggregate per capita Income. 
Column 9 the same as the cost-of-living index in table 1 with the base year shifted. 
See discussion in text for details of calculations. 
Sources: Central Statistics Office, Mar. 1983, Feb. 1987; IL0, 1970, 1975. 1980, 1987; Sierra 
Leone Labour Congress, 1987. 
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Table 9. Manufacturing average earnings and manufacturing GDP 
deflator 1966-85 (selected years) 
Item 1966 1972 1975 1985 
Average earnings 
(Le per week) 7.26 8.15 11.31 45.74 
GDP deflator 95 100 119 833 
Producer real wage 94 100 117 67 
Source: ILO, 1978 and TUC, 1987. 
Four selected years over two decades illustrate the main trend. 
Between 1966 and 1975 producer real wage rose,29 but after that it fell 
quite sharply, by 43 per cent. Clearly the gainers from the drastic 
change in the rural-urban gap were the entrepreneurs. 
How much of the above changes was caused by structural adjustment is 
difficult to assess precisely, part of the difficulty arising from the 
problem of defining when structural adjustment began. A falling wage-farm 
income ratio was already an established trend when Sierra Leone entered 
into major policy-based lending in 1981. What is clear is that in the 
1980s this trend was accelerated by rapid inflation which can at least 
partially be blamed on devaluation. It would be more prudent to conclude 
that whatever the effect of adjustment, to the extent that it was 
predicated upon the existence of a rural-urban gap in favour of wager 
earners30 its diagnosis was incorrect. 
What does the information in this section tell one about labour 
markets in Sierra Leone during the adjustment process? Quite clearly, 
urban labour markets had considerable surplus in the 1980s because of the 
decline of non-agricultural sectors. This was partly a longer-term trend 
reflecting the decline of mining, but also the result of adjustment, which 
through devaluation, the contraction of imports, and the cuts in 
government expenditure reduced consumer demand. It is much more difficult 
to determine what happened in the rural labour markets. The general 
decline of the monetary economy probably reduced rural non-farm 
employment. It may also have reduced the demand by net food buyers (rural 
and urban) for basic staples, thus impacting upon the cash incomes of net 
sellers of rice, corn, etc. Whatever happened to relative agricultural 
prices (see next section), the demand for export crops would have been 
unaffected by the decline of the money economy (at least with regard to 
partial equilibrium effects). Therefore, the incomes of export crop 
producers might well have improved relatively to incomes of food 
producers, even with no relative price shift. No doubt the changes that 
occurred manifested themselves in changes in migration, remittances and 
labour reallocation in general. 
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IV. Adjustment programmes and price incentives 
As we have seen the balance of payments crisis of the 1980s resulted 
from the secular decline of mining. If the lost foreign exchange earnings 
were to be recovered in the medium term, it had to be from the three tree 
crops, coffee, cocoa and palm kernels. Looming large in the discussion of 
agricultural policy during the 1980s was the judgement by the 
multilaterals that export crop prices were too low, discouraging 
production.31 This hypothesis is now examined. It was demonstrated in 
Section IV that increases in the prices of export crops, ceteris paribus. 
would increase rural-urban as well as intra-rural inequality. But would 
the output effect of higher prices outweigh the social and economic cost 
of greater inequality? 
In unregulated markets, farmers would face the international price 
of their crop (with a discount for intermediaries, transport, etc.). As 
shown in the case of rice, unregulated markets do not always provide 
positive incentives since prices can rise as well as fall. This would 
certainly have been the case for Sierra Leone's three major crops, coffee, 
cocoa and palm kernels, for their international prices have been quite 
volatile over the last 20 years32 and have fallen in real terms in the 
last 15. Ceteris paribus, producers should have switched resources away 
from these crops. Thus a fluctuating or stagnant product performance in 
Sierra Leone is not by itself evidence of inappropriate government 
intervention at work; the world market could have generated the same 
outcome. 
The disincentive effect of the SLPMB on export crops can be of two 
types. First, the marketing board price could discourage production by 
holding the price in any year below the world market price. If farm 
supply curves are upward-si oping, then output would be reduced below the 
unregulated equilibrium level. If the producer price is sufficiently low, 
production could be depressed below the point where variable costs are 
covered, and production would cease for the representative farm. This 
first disincentive might be called the "static output effect". Second, 
the marketing board might pay a substantial share of the world price over 
a number of years, but not adjust its price to changes in the world 
price. In this case, price policy fails to pass on the allocative signals 
from the world market: when the world market price rises, output should 
rise; when the world price falls, output should fall. This second 
disincentive could be called the "dynamic allocative effect". 
The SLPMB has since independence passed on world market price 
increases to the export farmers (see table 10). For each crop the 
producer price is estimated as a function of the FOB export price.33 In 
all three cases the elasticity exceeds 0.9, and for palm kernels it is not 
significantly different from unity. These coefficients imply that 
virtually all the annual increases in the export price were passed on to 
the producer (ignoring the role of private intermediaries). In no case is 
the constant term significant, so that all of the explanatory power is in 
the coefficient on the export price. 
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Table 10. Regression analysis of the SLPMB producer price and 
the FOB export price. 1964-86 (natural log functions) 
Crop Constant World price Adjusted R2 
Palm kernels .096 .992 .868 
t-statistics (-.86) (11.8) (1964-85) 
Coffee .104 .900 .961 
t-statistics (.36) 23.4 (1964-86) 
Cocoa .183 .907 .954 
t-statistics (.58) (21.6) (1964-86) 
Source: Levi, 1976; World Bank, 1981; BSL items b, c, d. 
However, could it be the case that the producer price was so low 
that farmers were absolutely discouraged such that the market signals had 
little effect? While this is what the Bank and the Fund allege, it is an 
extremely difficult question to answer without data on cost of production, 
which are not available. The best one can do is to work with indirect 
evidence, presented in table 11, which gives marketing board purchases and 
sales along with relevant relative prices.34 
Three relative prices are given: the ratio of the producer price to 
the urban cost of.living, frequently and erroneously called "agriculture's 
terms of trade", the ratio of the producer price to the FOB export 
price; and the ratio of the producer price to the FOB export price less 
transport charges and buying agents' commission. On the presumption that 
without a marketing board farmers would still have to pay handling charges 
and commission, the latter ratio is the more accurate measure of the 
difference between the producer price and the export price. 
The table shows that generalisations about the relationship between 
relative prices and production performance are not straightforward. Table 
10 showed that there was no significant dynamic allocative effect, so the 
only disincentive at issue is the level of the producer price (static 
output effect). Producer prices most closely approximated export prices 
for palm kernels, with the ratio exceeding 100 per cent during the 1980s. 
If raising the producer price relatively to the export price could 
stimulate production, then palm kernel production should have expanded. 
In the event, it was an unmitigated disaster, falling by almost 90 per 
cent in the mid-1980s compared to 1964-74. 
The explanation for the decline lies in part with the world price of 
palm kernels, which was falling even as farmers received a larger share of 
it. This decline in the world price explains why the producer price rose 
relatively to the export price, but fell relatively to the urban price 
index. Maintaining price incentives for palm kernel producers would have 
involved rejecting market signals and extending massive subsidies to 
farmers. Thus the World Bank experts had not done their sums when in 1984 
they wrote, "Production [of palm products] has been depressed by adverse 
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= index of producer price divided by the 
Freetown cost of living index; 
PdrPr/XpPr = producer price divided by fob export price, 
expressed as percentage; 
PdrPr/NcXpPr = producer price divided by fob export price 
less transport charges and buying agents' commission, 
expressed as percentage; 
n.a. - not applicable, palm kernels are partially 
processed, so export weight would not equal weight 
purchased from farmers. 
Index numbers based on average of 1964-87 = 100 
1964-69: Levi, 1976, pp. 199-201; 1970-75: World Bank, 

















































pricing policies" (World Bank, 1984, p. 25); from 1980 to 1984 producer 
prices had been above the world price. 
The results for coffee and cocoa are quite mixed. After the 1960s 
coffee production stagnated, with little clear relation to relative 
prices. The ratio of the producer price of coffee to the urban cost of 
living was lower in the 1970s than in the 1980s, but output was higher in 
the earlier decade; the ratio of the producer price to the export price 
was roughly the same in the two decades, but again, output was higher 
during the earlier period. In the case of cocoa, a falling producer price 
relatively to the export price was associated with a near-doubling of 
output over the 1960s and 1970s. Further, for all three crops regressions 
explaining output in terms of relative prices proved insignificant. 
The overall conclusion is that while coffee and cocoa producers were 
taxed (perhaps highly taxed by some comparisons), this seems to have had 
no clear link to production of the two export crops. Palm kernels were 
hardly taxed at all on average over the entire period, yet did badly. 
This does not imply that price made no difference, but rather that 
production is not dependent up price alone, particularly in the case of 
tree crops. If in the future the Government of Sierra Leone wishes to 
stimulate the production of coffee, cocoa and palm kernels, certainly it 
must pursue a price policy that provides a reasonable return to farmers. 
But it also must do much more than this: provide agricultural extension 
work, facilitate access to modern inputs, allow for credit on affordable 
terms, etc. Thus, the allegations that government price policy seriously 
discouraged export performance are misleading. Certainly the Government 
held producer prices below export prices, imposing a heavy tax burden upon 
producers. At the same time it consistently passed on changes in export 
prices to producers. The empirical evidence offers little support for the 
view that a low level of producer prices discouraged production. 
This section would not be complete were we to miss the theme of 
export taxation. Clearly in the early period export crops were heavily 
taxed as shown in the JASPA report (JASPA, 1981) and in Jamal's paper on 
taxation of export producers (Jamal, 1986). It should be noted from table 
10 that overt taxation did not decline for coffee and cocoa. The coffee 
producers were taxed more in the 1980s than in the 1970s, and the cocoa 
producers about the same. The decline was for palm kernel producers 
only. Some might argue that this decline was spurious, since implicit 
taxation through the exchange rate came to the fore between 1980 and 
1983. Implied by this argument is that in such a context ratios of 
domestic price to export price can be misleading; they may well rise and 
even exceed unity, but that does not signify reduced taxation. The 
figures in table 11 should thus be carefully interpreted. 
Of course, this view of taxation derives from the concept of "the 
over-valued exchange rate", one of center-pieces in the neoclassical 
vision of "market distortions". There is a certain circularity in the 
concept, since its theoretical existence derives from the simultaneous 
existence of a balance of payments disequilibrium. The circularity arises 
because this approach presumes that the disequilibrium would be eliminated 
by adjustment of the exchange rate itself (that is precisely the 
theoretical sense in which it is "over-valued"). If one does not think 
that the exchange rate adjustment will equilibrate the balance of 
payments, then the concept of "over-valuation" becomes very problematical 
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indeed (particularly insightful from this theoretical point of view is 
Taylor, 1983). If one approaches the question of empirically, it appears 
that the leone was not substantially over-valued in the 1980s in terms of 
the usual measures of the IMF. ' 
The point of this discussion of export crops has been to relate it 
to rural labour markets. The most important labour market issue is 
whether relative price changes occurred, and if so whether a reallocation 
of labour occurred. To treat this issue, food crops, and rice 
specifically, must first be considered. 
Rice 
Central to the issues of inequality and the performance of Sierra 
Leonean agriculture is one's assessment of rice production and 
availability. Table 12 gives estimates of total rice production and 
actual imports, with the periods chosen to focus on the adjustment 
process - 1976-81 being "pre-adjustment" and 1982-87 years of at least 
attempted adjustment (see discussion in section II and particularly table 
1). From a low level through the mid-1970s rice imports began to rise 
rapidly. Imports were consistently above 50,000 tons after 1978, with 
domestic production providing a fluctuating but generally declining 
proportion of total available rice (the "self-sufficiency" ratio in the 
table). In the World Bank reports after 1981 this was interpreted as a 
reflection of the failure of government policy. Also worrisome is the 
apparent inadequacy of rice in the national diet as shown in the 
"requirement" column. 
Rice policy since before independence was the responsibility of the 
Sierra Leone Rice Corporation, which performed a purchasing function, 
setting a producer price for rice, as well as importing and maintaining 
buffer stocks. IMF and World Bank conditionality in the mid-1980s 
required that "the price of rice ... be market determined" (World Bank, 
1986, p. 6), and a government stabilisation programme document (written in 
close collaboration with the Bank and the Fund) pledged that "as of 1 
January 1987 the price of rice will be market determined ..." (6SL, 
January 1987, p. 25; and in a similar vein, GSL, September 1985, p. 16). 
In addition, conditionality required that rice imports be privatised and 
the operations of the Board be drastically curtailed. 
It is somewhat perplexing why the Rice Board was singled out for 
such criticism, for whatever may have been the causes of the growth of 
imports, government price and purchasing policy were not among them. In 
the heyday of its purchases from farmers (1960s), the Board bought on 
average only 2 per cent of production, and at that time the World Bank had 
concluded that the Government "has largely failed in its effort to take 
over [the rice] trade", and "the Board ... has no effective control over 
the prices actually paid to the farmers for their produce" (World Bank, 
1969,.ftp. 6). Fifteen years later the Bank's judgement remained the 
same.38 Why within two years the Bank demanded that the price of rice 
be "market determined" when its agricultural specialists reported such to 
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Import policy as also been accused of undermining domestic rice 
production and stimulating excessive consumption by holding down market 
prices. One finds repeated references to the "rice subsidy" and in the 
mid-1980s its elimination became an item of multilateral conditionality. 
Here, again, the evidence suggests a misperception, as table 13 shows. 
The first column is the government purchase price, included in the table 
for comparative purposes. This is followed by that price converted from 
units of unmilled to units of milled rice. It is perhaps the implied 
official price of milled that caused the misperception that the Government 
was creating disincentives. However, this price was irrelevant, as we 
saw. Column three is the unregulated retail price in Freetown,39 and 
column four the import price of rice. 

























































































Note; This table is reproduced from MAF, 1988, pp. 35 and 42. All 
numbers are the same except for the units for the domestic market 
price, from a retail unit of 10 ounces to metric tons. The 
Ministry source converted quantities of unmilled into milled by a 
factor of .525. 
When the unregulated market price is divided by the import price, in 
all years the ratio is greater than unity; thus, consumers in Freetown 
(and probably elsewhere) paid more than the import price. Since the 
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import price was below the domestic market price, rice import-policy 
should not have discouraged production to any great extent. Of 
course, there would always be the "overvalued exchange rate" argument to 
fall back on, but as discussed before empirical evidence gives little 
support for this view. In any case, it would have taken an extremely 
"overvalued" exchange rate indeed to negate the difference between the 
domestic and import prices. 
The increase in rice imports is not explained by government price 
policy, either at the farmgate or retail level. A more promising 
explanation is demographic changes.41 Looking back at table 12, we see 
that total population increased by 35.3 per cent over the 11 years. 
Further, as was shown in table 6, the proportion of the total population 
producing food was declining during these years. Indeed, evidence seems 
to indicate that agricultural productivity was rising at a modest rate, 
but this was overwhelmed by population growth and the relative decline in 
the number of food producing and selling households. 
This is a paper about labour markets, not rice prices, but the two 
are closely related in Sierra Leone. As discussed in section I, the 
purpose of structural adjustment in Sierra Leone need not necessarily have 
been to shift the terms of trade against rice even within the orthodox 
adjustment framework. In Sierra Leone, an increase in the relative price 
of rice would have the same effect as an increase in the relative price of 
cash crops if it increased production: it would save foreign exchange. 
This is an obvious point that frequently goes unnoted: the purpose of 
devaluation is to raise the return to all tradeables - import substitutes 
as well as exports. On this point theory is quite clear, and certainly 
there would be no dispute from the World Bank or the IMF (thus, the 
emphasis upon "efficient" import substitution associated with 
devaluation). 
As the previous discussion showed, the price of rice in Sierra Leone 
was market determined in the 1970s and 1980s. One can then ask, what were 
the incentive effects of the market determined prices? Table 14 indicates 
the answer to this question. The first column gives the domestic market 
price of rice, followed by the Freetown cost of living index. The purpose 
of these series is to compute the price of rice relatively to the domestic 
price level (this is found in column five). In columns three and four 
time series are provided to calculate the same ratio for the world market 
approximated by the ratio of the international price to the United States 
GNP deflator. Were there free trade in rice, then in theory domestic 
prices should approximate "border" prices. Some would take this as a sign 
of reduced "distortions". 
Theory would predict that the two relative price series would move 
together if both are market determined (this is implied by the famous "law 
of one price"). In fact, they did not and just as well, for had they done 
so, Sierra Leonean farmers would have been victims of severe price 
disincentives indeed, for the world price of rice fell much more 
relatively to the measure of the world price level than was the case for 
the relative price of rice within Sierra Leone. In other words, if the 
multilateral adjustment programmes had significantly deregulated markets 
and prompted domestic relative prices to move toward international 
relative prices (their professed intent), then the effect would have been 
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to generate severe price disincentives for the production of rice and 
incentives for its consumption. This is the precise opposite of the 
result that the World Bank sought to bring about: 
It seems clear that regardless of the progress made in promoting the 
production of rice, demand would then have to be curtailed to a 
considerable extent, either through rationing or measures which 
increase price (World Bank, March 1984). 





















































































































ely reflect division by figures in columns 
because of rounding to integers. The "USA GNP def." is the 
overall price deflator for United States gross national product, 
as reported in the annual Economic Report of the President, 
referring to the June to May period in each case. The base has 
been moved from 1982 = 100. "Total consumption" is "available" 
rice from table 11. Per capita consumption is total consumption 
divided by the population. 
Sources: International rice price: UN, 1985, p. 208; FA0, 1979, p. 293 
and FAO, 1987, p. 335. US deflator: US Council of Economic 
Advisors, 1988, p. 252. Freetown cost of living for 1986-87 and 
1987-88: BSL, items c and d. Other sources, see table 13. 
WPlOlPl/cw 
- 26 -
Achieving this goal in the 1980s would have required market 
intervention, not market liberalisation. From a perspective that views 
markets as generating the most efficient outcomes, it is unclear how such 
an intervention would be justified. Further, the effect of curtailing 
rice consumption, particularly through arbitrarily higher prices, would be 
to place the burden of adjustment on the poorer households, urban and 
rural. The numbers in table 14 show that a falling price of rice 
relatively to other prices was the judgement of international markets. 
The analysis now comes to the issue of relative prices in the 
agricultural adjustment process, food versus export crops, which in Sierra 
Leone means rice versus export crops. The basic information is found in 
table 15. Here the prices of coffee, cocoa and palm kernels have been 
divided by the rice price. At the bottom of the table the ratios are 
demarcated into two periods, pre-adjustment (1976-81) and adjustment 
(1982-87). The export crop prices in question are, of course, the 
producer prices, since the purpose of the comparison is to draw 
implications about the impact of adjustment on the relative returns to 
different crops. The conclusion of the story is that apparently nothing 
of note happened to these relative prices. For all three export crops 
their average price relatively to rice was lower in the second period, but 
the standard deviations are so large that the difference in means is not 
significant. Thus, devaluation seems to have had no impact on the 
relative prices of export crops and rice. 
Table 15. Relative agricultural prices. 1976-87 
Year Producer prices (Leone per ton) Rice price divided into: 
Coffee Cocoa Palm kernel Coffee Cocoa Palm kernel 
















































































































Standard deviations are given in parenthesis 
Source: BSL items b, c, d. 
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At considerable risk of labouring the obvious, we can ask: why did 
not devaluation change the relative price of rice to exports to a 
significant degree? As pointed out before, rice is a tradeable, so one 
would expect its price to rise relatively to non-tradeables, and its 
relationship to other tradeables would be a priori indeterminate. As an 
extension of this neoclassical argument, with liberalisation of markets 
what happens to relative prices among tradeables depends upon what is 
happening to relative prices in the world market. This is the point of 
the World Bank's insistence that domestic prices in Sierra Leone more 
closely conform to "border prices". Indeed, in the abstract it is 
possible that devaluation would demonstrate that Sierra Leone's 
"comparative advantage" lay in rice, not coffee, cocoa, or palm products, 
and in consequence would result in a "switching" of crops between the 
external and internal markets. Theory indicates that there should be no 
surprise that these relative prices showed no change. It would be a 
contradiction of the structural adjustment remedy if the prices of the 
four tradeables we are discussing had not risen relatively to 
non-tradeables. Unfortunately, the national income deflators are not 
sufficiently disaggregated to test this issue. 
Finally, it should be noted that there is a very practical reason 
why the price of export crops might not have risen relatively to rice: 
the former was marketing-board determined, while the latter was not. In a 
period of rapid inflation as during 1982-87, it is probably inevitable 
that administered prices would rise slower than the general price level. 
Inflation is the result of excess demand (monetary or real, depending upon 
one's theoretical approach) and manifests itself first in those prices 
that are the most flexible. The attempt of the authorities to raise 
producer prices could be self-undermining: an increase in the coffee 
price (say) increases the incomes of coffee producers, who spend this 
income in domestic commodity markets, thereby further feeding the 
inflation that prompted the increase in the coffee price in the first 
place. This and the above considerations should clarify why there was no 
trend in the relative agricultural prices and none need be expected. 
What devaluation does seem to have generated is considerable 
relative price instability, . for the coefficients of variations are much 
higher for the adjusting period than before for all three crops To the 
extent that fluctuations create a perception of insecurity, and insecurity 
discourages expanding production, devaluation may have provided 
across-the-board disincentives for market agriculture in Sierra Leone. 
The demand-constrained rice story and the absence of an 
adjustment-induced change in relative crop prices provide revealing 
insights into labour markets during the adjusting years. During these 
years rice production was on a generally downward path. Since rice is the 
crop which created the greatest absolute demand for hired labour, rural 
labour markets would have gone into excess supply in the absence of a 
shift of labour to export crops. Apparently the price shifts that would 
have prompted such a shift of labour did not occur. Recall that at the 
same time urban labour markets were also in excess supply. There may or 
may not have been a reallocation of labour from urban to rural 
activities; there is simply no direct evidence on this. But if it did 
occur, it was not the result of price signals, but rather because the 
contraction of urban income opportunities was greater than for rural. In 
other words, involved were quantity adjustments, not price adjustments. 
To the extent that relative prices changed between town and countryside, 
it was the consequence, not the cause, of shifts in labour allocation. z 
WPlOlPl/cw 
- 28 -
V. Conclusions: Adjustment and labour markets 
This paper has focused upon the impact of structural adjustment 
programmes on rural incomes and labour markets, and on rural-urban 
interactions. Despite the lack of direct data, characteristic of most SSA 
countries, a few conclusions seem warranted. Since independence the 
pressure on land probably resulted in subdivision, increasing rural 
inequality. Adjustment itself generated at least two tendencies to 
accentuate this long-term trend. Inequality may have increased because 
large farms market a greater proportion of their output than small farms, 
and rural money incomes are more affected by economic decline than 
subsistence incomes. With no information available on the allocation of 
labour and land among farm families, no definitive statement is possible. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that the following labour market 
processes occurred: 
(1) Non-farm rural households suffered compared to farm households. 
(2) The demand for agricultural labour declined during adjustment. 
Limited by effective demand, the marketed output of rice declined. 
Taken together, the output of export crops did not increase 
substantially during adjustment compared to pre-adjustment (coffee 
output rose, cocoa fell, and palm kernels collapsed). If the demand 
for labour increased at all in the production of these crops, it 
would have been insufficient to compensate for the decline in the 
rice sector. 
(3) If a reallocation of labour occurred between food crops and export 
crops, this was not the result of price signals, since under the 
demand-constrained conditions prevailing, prices were derivative 
from market clearing, not the vehicle of equilibration. 
(4) The demand for labour in urban areas declined. 
The effect of liberalisation on labour markets as distinct from 
devaluation is easier to judge. The allegation that government price 
policy had seriously discouraged export performance and liberalisation 
would improve matters is misleading. While the Government held producer 
prices below export prices, at the same time it consistently passed on 
changes in export prices to producers. In other words, it was giving the 
right signals. Empirical evidence offers little support for the view that 
a low level of producer prices discouraged production, though one must not 
forget the high level of peasant taxation. The export crop for which 
output performed worst is that whose producer price exceeded the export 
price throughout the 1980s (palm kernels). In this case the decline in 
production and the extent to which it is price-related, resulted from 
market-transmitted disincentives (a declining world price). 
For rice, policy instruments acting on relative prices would not 
affect production except in so far as they raised the domestic price above 
what the international market determined; i.e., intervention, not 
liberalisation, would be necessary (though administratively this would 
probably be impractical, as in the past). The problem of rising rice 
imports was the result of demographic change and falling world market 
prices (with the latter perhaps derivative from the implicit and explicit 
subsidies by rice-exporting countries). 
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Based upon misconceptions and misdiagnosis, the multilateral 
adjustment programmes for Sierra Leone might well have made the situation 
worse. The major misconceptions were: (1) that there existed a 
substantial rural-urban gap; (2) that the economy was distorted by 
ill-conceived market interventions by the Government; and (3) that market 
signals could not but help set things on the right course. Put 
technically, the economy was misdiagnosed as being constrained by 
inappropriate relative prices. This approach, so typical of the 
multilateral approach to the African development crisis, bore even less 
relation to the problems of Sierra Leone, whose economy was constrained by 
a secularly declining export sector, demographic change, and resource 
limitations in agriculture. The major effect of the adjustment programme 
may have been to add to these constraints two more: (1) a decline in 
effective demand as a result of government expenditure reductions and 
other demand-depressing measures; and (2) a general climate of economic 
uncertainty resulting from the rapid inflation provoked by large nominal 
devaluations. To the extent that the liberalisation measures had any 
effect, they pushed policy in the wrong direction, increasing the 
vulnerability of the economy to external shocks and discouraging long-run 
planning interventions which would be central to restructuring the 




1 This familiar approach is stated in many documents of the World 
Bank and IMF. A general statement of the strategy for African countries 
is found in World Bank, 1984; and more recently, World Bank and UNDP, 
1989. An attempt to empirically establish the relationship between real 
exchange rates and export performance in Africa is found in Balassa, 1988. 
* There are a number of approaches to the analysis of the impact 
of devaluation, at least one of which (the "monetarist" approach) suggests 
that adjusting the nominal exchange rate cannot alter relative prices 
within a country due to "the law of one price". For a discussion of the 
various contending positions see Ghani, 1984. 
3 Some have alleged that there was diamond smuggling during the 
1960s and 1970s, which would have been reduced had the exchange rate not 
been "overvalued". It is impossible to confirm or reject this hypothesis, 
since there are no data on illicit exports of diamonds. 
* For those preferring UNCTAD figures, they show that in the 
1960s per capita income increased at 5.7 per cent per annum, then in the 
1970s it stagnated while in the 1980s it declined by 2 per cent per 
annum. Altogether, the spurt in the 1960s assured Sierra Leone a positive 
growth (1.6 per cent per annum) between 1960 and 1987. UNCTAD, 1988, 
table 6-2, which gives figures more recent (up to 1987) than the national 
sources. 
5 In the 1960s, the standard deviation of the growth rate was 
almost equal to the mean growth rate itself (this ratio being the 
coefficient of variations during the 1970s, it was 20 per cent larger, 
and in the 1980s seven times larger. 
6 In 1976 iron ore production ceased (except for a brief attempt 
to revive it in 1982-84), and the alluvial diamond deposits began to yield 
less output. Still, for the five years 1976 to 1980, officially measured 
diamond exports averaged US$95 million annually, then fell to half that 
for the next five years (US$43 million during 1981-85). Export 
performance is treated in more detail in a subsequent section. With 
regard to diamond exports, some of the decline represents an increase in 
illegal exports, primarily through Liberia. However, there is general 
agreement that th total volume of exports declined due to growing 
exhaustion of the alluvial deposits. 
7 On 27 July 1986 when the Government "freed" the exchange rate 
it stood at 5.7 leone to the US dollar. On 26 September when the policy 
was suspended it had reached 30, subsequently touching 38 by January 
1987. The exchange rate story is summarised in GSL, 1987, pp. 31 ff. 
WP101P2/cw 
- 31 -
8 Referring specifically to the balance of payments, a World Bank 
Report on Sierra Leone puts it well: 
Adjustments to external shocks differ depending on the nature of the 
shock and the structure of the economy. The more advanced and 
integrated the internal productive structure is, the easier it is 
for the economy to adjust. However, in [no] case can the shift 
restore the balance of payments without undue hardship. ... The 
structure of Sierra Leone's economy, like that of other African 
countries, is not integrated enough to permit internal adjustments 
without severe deflation (World Bank, 1985, pp. 97-98.) 
* The correspondence in the title and the theme was more than 
coincidental. The Bank made ample use of the JASPA document, including, 
critically, the estimates of the income distribution profile. 
^ For example, one reads, "The lack of competition appears to 
exacerbate the wide spread between producer prices and final consumer or 
export prices." (World Bank, 1981, p. vii.) 
H "So far only slow progress has been made toward either 
effectively raising the incomes of the poor or adequately taxing the 
incomes of the rich. Both are necessary." (World Bank, 1981, p. iii.) 
The same point was made earlier and in more detail in the JASPA report. 
See also Jamal 1986. 
*2 In this context, it is worth noting that country report of 1976 
had given an endorsement to government price policy towards agriculture: 
These farm price changes [after 1974] dramatically turned the terms 
of trade in favour of the rural population, provided the much needed 
production incentives, and since 1974 there are signs that 
agricultural production is showing significant gains for the first 
time in years. (World Bank, 1976, p. 1.) 
Thus, the positive judgements of the 1981 report should not be seen 
as an anomaly. 
13 For example, a 20 per cent cut in government wages and salaries 
in real terms was set as conditionality (World Bank, 1985, p. vii). The 
Bank's position is also contained in World Bank, 1986, and the 
conditionality for an adjustment loan (as yet not granted) is detailed in 
two government documents Sierra Leone, 1985 and Sierra Leone, 1987. 
1* This IMF programme is analysed in the excellent study by Lisk 
(1974), in which he argues that it played a central role in bringing about 
a rejuvenation of the economy. For the current situation I am indebted to 
Mr. Jim Funna, West African representative to the World Bank, and Mr. 
Wellington of the Bank of Sierra Leone for their helpful discussions. 
*5 The pre-funding conditionality was quite explicit. In a 1984 
report one reads, "... [Bank] assistance should be closely linked to 
further policy reform, such as improvements in the allocation of budget 
and foreign exchange resources to [agriculture], and to the maintenance of 
an incentive structure for agricultural production ... (World Bank, 1984, 
p. viiii.). Some conditionality for the "pre-program" or "shadown 
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program" was quite specific. For example, a government document of 1987 
notes that tractor services must be privatised not the failure to do so 
would "jeopardise the SAL negotiations" (GSL, 1987, p. 24.) 
16 This section is based on Jamal, 1982 and 1986 and the chapter 
by Jamal on agriculture in JASPA, 1981. 
1' The 1984 World Bank report on the agriculture sector argued 
that there existed considerable unused arable land in Sierra Leone (World 
Bank, 1984, pp. iv and 25). Based on a fallow period of 10-12 years the 
Bank concluded that around 20 per cent more land could be cultivated. The 
report however added, "Some experts argue that 18-20 years is optimal from 
yield and soil conservation aspects" (p. 13). If this fallow cycle is 
assumed, the alleged surfeit of land becomes an acute shortage. The idea 
of a land surplus was also based on a claim that "less than 10 per cent of 
the potentially arable swamplands are cultivated" (p. 13 and iv). 
18 The most extensive study was that done by USAID in 1977, in 
which it was estimated that 27 per cent of rural children were 
malnourished and 60 per cent suffered from anaemia. The study states: 
"As the consumption figures ... indicate, seriously inadequate calorie 
levels characterise the low-expenditure [rural] households" (ON, USAID, 
1978, pp. xiii, xxiv). See also Dahniya and Kangbai, 1986, and FAO, 1988. 
19 The information from the 1965-66 survey is not included, since 
it is not strictly comparable. In that survey just over 10 per cent of 
farms were listed as being of unknown size, while in the later two surveys 
all farms were assigned to a category. 
20 The total rural population rose by 8 per cent, which was 
accommodated by an increase in size of household from 5.6 to 6.8 (CSO, 
1972; and MAF, 1986; see especially MAF, 1988, pp. 1-2; and COS, 
1986). Over the same period farm households also increased, from 7 to 
7.9. Evidence of this increase is found in a survey conducted in 1974-75, 
which reported an average farm family to be 7.4 persons (Spencer and 
Byerlee, 1977). The increase in size of household is consistent with the 
rapid population growth over the period. 
2* It is assumed that farmers receive 60 per cent of the urban 
market price, except in the case of regulated export crops (coffee, cocoa 
and palm kernels, in which case farmgate payment to producers was used). 
The 60 per cent figure was obtained from interviews with Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry officials. 
22 The average income for all farm households so derived is very 
close to that obtained by dividing agricultural value added in the 
national accounts by the number of farm households. The latter figure was 
Le 5,247 (see table 8), and when non-crop value added is subtracted, the 
crop value added per household is Le 4,406 (table 4 does not include 
hunting, forestry and animal husbandry). This is less than 5 per cent 
above the mean income in table 8. As will be seen below, the two 
estimates were obtained independently of each other: in table 4 the 
estimate of intermediate production was taken from Spencer and Byerlee 
(1977); the crop prices from the Agricultural Statistical Bulletins: and 
the discount for farmgate prices from Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
estimates. It is possible that the table duplicates the method used to 
estimate agricultural value added in the national accounts. 
WP101P2/cw 
- 33 -
23 This point would seem too obvious to require elaboration except 
that a US Department of Agriculture report makes the opposite argument 
(that price increases for rice would improve income distribution): "These 
[low-income] households depend upon rice production more heavily than the 
other households; they also produce a larger share of their rice for the 
market" (USDA, Apr. 1984, p. 14). The 1984-85 farm survey shows the first 
allegation to be wrong. But even were it not, commonsense refutes the 
second. Everyone is agreed that rice is the major staple of poor rural 
households. If it were true that such households "produce a larger share 
of their rice for the market", then it would be the case that poor 
households were selling rice on the market, then repurchasing it for 
consumption. It is difficult to imagine how this could reflect rational 
behaviour. 
2* These have been collected by the Ministry of Labour since the 
early 1960s and are also reported in ILO, 1987. 
25 The ratio actually overstates the position of wage incomes, for 
it makes no allowance for the price differential in commodities between 
urban and rural areas. Evidence from three household surveys over two 
decades verifies that urban prices are higher than rural when weighted for 
consumption patterns. Jamal incorporated this price differential into his 
calculations and obtained a narrower wage earner/farmer gap for the 1970s 
than is shown in table 7 (Jamal 1982). 
26 This poverty line calculation is also used in Jamal, 1982, and 
is lower than that found in Lisk and van der Hoeven, 1979. 
27 This point has been made by Jamal in Jamal 1988a with respect 
to Uganda and Jamal 1988b, generalised to sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. 
See also Jamal and Weeks, 1988. 
28 Derived by dividing the manufacturing wage by the implicit 
manufacturing price deflator from the national accounts. 
29 Note that this did not imply that workers gained relatively to 
capitalists because the table does not account for productivity increase. 
If output per worker rose as much or more than the producer real wage, 
then profit per worker remained the same or increased. The increase in 
the real producer wage was at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent, and 
productivity (for which there are no data) was probably at least this. 
30 "A significant impact of the Government's adjustment programme 
will be a relative improvement in the income of a large part of the rural 
population as compared to that in urban areas." World Bank, 1986, p. 11. 
31 See particularly World Bank, 1984, p. 25. 
32 From 1964 through 1987, the coefficients of variation of world 
prices for coffee, cocoa and palm kernels were .59, .64, and .48. In the 
case of coffee, for example, this means that in any given year there was a 
two-thirds probability that the world price would be from 59 per cent 
below to 59 per cent above the average for the period. 
33 A logarithmic form is used, so that the coefficient on the 
export price measures the elasticity between the two prices. 
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34 Sources do not always agree (or even come close) on crop 
production. To deal with this problem, the table includes both SLPMB 
purchases from buying agents and recorded export sales, with the latter 
serving as a check on the former. The two are in close agreement after 
1974. Because weather and other stochastic factors can result in great 
year-to-year variation in crop output, five-year averages have been used 
(except for 1985-87). 
" This term is incorrect because a proper calculation of the 
terms of trade would have to include the cost of farm inputs (which the 
consumer price index does not); and the consumer price index would need 
to be reweighted to reflect rural consumption patterns rather than urban 
ones. The most obvious example of a difference in consumption patterns is 
that rural Sierra Leoneans do not for the most part pay rent. 
36 The results are so poor that they do not bear reporting. The 
price variables are all non-significant and the R-squares less than .1 
(negative when adjusted for degrees of freedom in the case of coffee). 
37 Investigation of this issue lies beyond the scope of this 
report. However, available from Weeks are calculations comparing Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'lvoire and Senegal, with these 
countries chosen because of their similar agricultural export crops. 
Using the usual measure, the nominal exchange rate multiplied by the 
domestic price index and dividing by the US price index (the common 
approximation for the prices of trading partners), one finds that over the 
year 1980-87, Sierra Leone's purchasing power parity ("real") exchange 
rate declined slightly, while those for Liberia, Cote d'lvoire, and 
Senegal rose. Ghana and Nigeria's "real" exchange rates declined more 
than Sierra Leone's. 
38 While the Government announces a farmgate price for paddy 
(unmilled rice), actual prices to producers are determined more by market 
conditions and vary considerably above and below the official prices ... " 
(World Bank, 1984, p. 22, emphasis added). 
39 The source is the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Agricultural Statistical Bulletin. These prices are measured per 10 ounce 
container, the common unit of sale for milled rice. A note to the table 
in Bulletin III states: 
Obtained as part of the consumer Price Index exercise. Due to 
budget constraints, figures are no longer obtained from sample 
purchases, instead the trader is asked to lend a sample purchase to 
the [Central Statistics Office] for weighing. The quoted price 
rather than the actual price is used. (MAF, 1986, p. 41.) 
Since this note appears first in Bulletin III, it can be assumed 
that prices through 1984 were collected on the basis of sample purchases. 
Finally, the price for 1975 is taken from the consumer price index, as 
reported in CSO, 1982. 
40 Lest one suspect that the prices provided by the Sierra Leone 
Government and given in table 12 are somehow in error, a comparison can be 
made to prices reported in the World Bank report of 1981. In that report, 
the Bank provided figures for the producer price, retail market price, and 
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•the unit import price of rice, for the years 1962-74. According to the 
World Bank, the retail price of rice was 75 per cent higher than the 
import price for these years. The table in the report makes it clear that 
the prices all refer to the same unit of measure (husk or milled 
equivalent). What then of the rice subsidies? Unfortunately, data on 
rice subsidies are not available. However, total subsidies to all state 
enterprises (one of which was the Rice Board) averaged US$12.5 million 
over the year 1973 through 1983 (CSO, 1980; and 1987). Rice subsidies 
would have been less than half of this. In 1986 IMF conditionality 
required that rice subsidies be limited to Le 45 million for the second 
half of the year, which converted to US$2.9 million (GSL, 1987, p. 31). 
Thus, the subsidies were not great. The mystery of how one could have 
subsidies at all when the retail price was above the import price is 
perplexing. Government sales may have gone to subsidise wholesalers (not 
consumers), who subsequently sold the cheap rice at the prevailing market 
price. 
4* This explanation was suggested by Levi in the 1970s, who 
attributed the increase in rice imports to the boom in alluvial mining 
which drew labour away from agriculture (Levi, 1976, p. 143). Jamal 1988 
has argued this for the sub-Saharan region as a whole. 
4* The argument being made here is usually called 
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